Reforming California
In the early 1900s California, along with a number
of other states of the Union, reformed itself. Historians group
this work of reformationpolitical and governmental in the
main, but touching also upon other aspects of public life
under the general rubric of "the Progressive movement."
Progressivism, we are told, helped to transform the United States
from an agricultural nation, owned by an omnipotent oligarchy
and governed by the corrupt party machines which the oligarchy
subsidized, into an urban industrial society that had begun to
put its political house in good order. Progressivism brought system
and benevolence to a haphazard, frequently cruel and capricious
Republic. Intense to the point of evangelism, by turns visionary
and pragmatic, Progressivism was energized by forces bubbling
up from deep within the collective Protestant bourgeois psyche.
All thisexternal reform and an inner drama of search and
meaning flourished most intensely in California. By 1912,
in fact, when Hiram Johnson, the Progressive governor of California,
was chosen by Theodore Roosevelt his vice-presidential candidate
on the Progressive (Bull Moose) ticket, the claim was made that
out of all the states of the Union to show signs of Progressive
transformation, California had experienced the most profound and
extensive upheaval and reform.
The reform and restructuring of California was
no easy matter. Despite the fact that most major reforms were
pushed through during a five-year period, 1910 to 1915, the gestation
period was long and arduous. Early attempts at reform usually
took the form of revolts against the all-encompassing power of
the Southern Pacific Railroad, or as Californians were wont to
call it, the SP. The SP offered the most obvious instance of what
was grossly wrong with California: a very few of the super-rich
virtually owned the stateits land, its economy, its governmentand
were running it as a private preserve. As a creation of the frontier
era, the SP epitomized as a corporation all the ruthless energy,
the scheming flexibility, the iron will to wealth and power that
had characterized the Gold Rush and first frontier era of California
through the 18705.
The ownership of the SP, the Big Four, was a
Gilded Age plutocracy, California style. Of relatively simple
Eastern backgrounds (three from upstate New York, one from Connecticut),
Leland Stanford, Mark Hopkins, Charles Crocker, and Collis P.
Huntington all came to California during the Gold Rush, went into
retailing in Sacramento, then by sheer cunning and will forged
a railroad across half a continent, enriching themselves in the
process beyond their wildest boyhood dreams: in railroads, steamship
companies, land holdings (vast acres were granted by the federal
government as a subsidy and spur to railroad construction), irrigation
projects, hotels, and urban real estate.
When Leland Stanford served as governor of California
during the Civil War. he served railroad interests as well. From
the start, the SP respected politics. Politics, after all, in
the form of massive federal loans and land grants, had created
the company. Beginning in the 18705, the SP systematically began
to gain as much influence over the politics of California as possible.
Between 1870 and 1900 the population of California grew from 560,247
to 1,485,053, and the SP grew from the third party of California
politics to the only party, holding Democrats and Republicans
alike in receivership. The reformist Constitution of 1879 created
a three-man railroad commission, intended to regulate the SP.
Stacked with genial retainers, the commission soon became waggishly
known as the Southern Pacific Literary Bureau. Few adverse regulations
came from this enfeebled commission in its thirty-year existence.
Nor did the courts set an opposite example. The
SP, for one thing, had a very good friend on the national Supreme
Court, Justice Stephen Field, a former California supreme court
justice appointed to the Court in 1863 by Abraham Lincoln at
the urging of the Big Four. Locally, the state supreme court could
usually be counted on. (Years later, Fremont Older remembered
the shock he felt when as a young San Francisco reporter in the
late i88os he first saw a California supreme court justice shamelessly
display his annual pass to a SP railroad conductor.) Between 1895
and 1910, 57 out of 79 rate cases to come before the California
Supreme Court were ruled in favor of the SP. No wonder the railroad
was able to adjust rates to suit its purposes, favoring some freight
shippers (especially those in which it held partial interest)
and driving the uncooperative out of business. Needing oil for
its trains, the railroad gained controlling interest in Associated
Oil, a subsidiary of Standard, then gave rebates to both companies,
which is to say to itself. Whatever was lost on oil shipments
could be made up elsewhere.
Established in 1893 and headquartered in offices
at Fourth and Townsend streets in San Francisco, the unambiguously
named Political Bureau of the Southern Pacific, presided over
by a skilled corporate attorney, William Frankln Herrin, chief
counsel to the railroad between 1893 and 1910, coordinated I the
affairs of a statewide, indeed nationwide, political network.
Experienced in the service of the oligarchy from his former service
on the staffs of the WilliamSharon estate and the vast Miller
and Lux holdings in the San Joaquin Valley, Herrin exercised control
over local party organizations through the simple technique of
placing key individuals on retainer. Elected legislators received
free passes and hotel rooms, campaign contributions, special rates
for their business friends. Since Republican party nominating
conventions were SP-controlled, a steady supply of favorable legislatorssuch
as Grove Johnson of Sacramento, tather of the future reform governorwas
insured. There were a few exceptions, but in the main the governors
and United States senators of California were equally friendly.
"From the village constable to the governor of the state,"
observed the reform-minded Dr. John R. Haynes of Los Angeles,
"the final selection of the people's officials lay with Mr.
Herrin or his subordinates in the railroad machine." Since
by 1900 half of California's population resided in four urban
centers, the control of city machines was crucial to the preservation
of SP interests. The SP initially exercised its influence in San
Francisco through Christopher Buckley, a blind saloon keeper turned
Democratic boss, but when Buckley sided with Leland Stanford when
Stanford broke with Huntington and ran for the Senate against
Huntington's wishes (Huntington had another candidate in mind),
Buckley rather precipitously found himself facing indictment,
and fled the country. Later the SP dealt with Buckley's more cooperative
successor, the dapper, persistently charming Abraham Ruef, a
brilliant attorney of French-Jewish ancestry who ran San Francisco
from 1902 onwards as boss of the Union Labor party.
The SP's man in Los Angeles, land agent and lobbyist
Walter Parker, was the perfect political boss for Ragtime America:
a portly, mustachioed man surveying life through a haze of cigar
smoke, by turns ruthless or genial, depending upon whether or
not he was getting his way. Parker ran the Republican party in
Southern California, keeping a close eye on Los Angeles affairs.
Controlling the wards, Parker put his men on the city council.
In 1906 Parker blatantly bribed City Clerk Harry J. Lelande (who
succumbed for a mere $1,000) to expedite an ordinance granting
the railroad right of way on a dry riverbed running through the
center of Los Angeles. Despite outraged protests when the bribe
was discovered, a thoroughly domesticated city council passed
the ordinance anyway.
This was not the first time that the railroad
had brazened out adverse public opinion. In 1880 the SP raised
prices on land it owned in Tulare County near the Kings River
from the "$2.50 upward" it had promised to from $17
to $40 an acre. The settlers who had moved onto the land, building
homes and barns and planting in expectation of the $2.50-an-acre
price, were understandably enraged. They refused to pay the new
price, and they refused to move. The SP
Three years later, in 1883, the public image of the SP took another downward turn. The widow of Collis P. Huntington's trusted associate David D. Colton, in the course of suing the railroad over the disputed value of stocksshe had inherited from her husband's estate, made public hundreds of letters exchanged between Huntington and Colton between 1874 and 1878. The bulk of these letters dealt with the delicate matter of bribing Washington congressmen and Sacramento legislators to favor pro-railroad legislation. Colton was supposed to have burned the correspondence.
The SP did not win any friends in Los Angeles
either with its ten-year effort, beginning in 1890, to impose
on the City of the Angels an SP-owned port in Santa Monica. Even
the affluent oligarchy of Los Angeles, normally well disposed
to the railroad, balked at Collis P. Huntington's plan, backed
by his friends in Washington, to organize the Port of Los Angeles
as an SP monopoly. The business community instantly realized what
the future of Los Angeles as a shipping center would be with
both the port and all rail access to the port exclusively in
SP hands. At the height of the port controversy, Huntington had
the chutzpah to propose to Congress that the SP not be asked to
pay back the $50 million due the federal government by 1899, when
the thirty-year loan from Congress with which the railroad was
first financed came due. Huntington sought instead a fifty-to-a-hundred-year
delay in repayment, with the SP paying only one-half of one percent
interest on the principal. Otherwise, Huntington argued, the
SP would be forced into bankruptcy. Few believed him. When Congress
rejected Huntington's proposal in January 1897, Governor James
H. Budd, a Democrat, declared a public holiday.
Governor Budd, a University of California-trained
engineer; Adolph Sutro, the Prussian-born Populist party mayor
of San Francisco (also an engineer by profession); and San
Francisco Examiner editor William Randolph Hearst openly fought
the SP through the last years of the nineteenth century. Their
opposition prepared the way for the bold challenge in 1899 of
the Ventura County oilman and rancher Thomas
Robert Bard. The fight against the SP had been spearheaded
in the 18905 by the short-lived Populist party. Bard, by
contrast, was no free-silver Populist, but a conservative, corporately
oriented Republican, one of the creators of the Union Oil Company
and its first president, angry at SP domination of his part) and
of his ranching, land development, and oil interests. Over the
years a conservatively oriented anti-SP faction of Southern Californian
Republicans, most of them entrepreneurs fearful of the growing
SP monopoly, had gathered around Bard, a somewhat aloof Pennsylvania-born
patrician, surprisingly high-minded for having made such a success
in the rough-and-tumble world of oil, land development, and ranching.
By 1899 this reform Republican faction had grown
powerful enough in the legislature to deny election to the United
States Senate to Colonel Daniel M. Burns of San Francisco, whom
the SP was advancing as a candidate after the collapse of the
candidacy of San Diego businessman Ulysses S. Grant, Jr., the
son of the late president, who had desperately wished to return
to Washington in triumph. A hearty hedonist with a checkered political
past, mining interests in Mexico, and a taste for liquor, women,
flashy clothes, and the race track, Colonel Burns was just the
sort of United States senator the SP had in mind: a longtime political
ally who, for a price, could be depended upon in Washington.
Thomas Bard, however, believed that to send Burns to the Senate
would constitute "a shame to our People and to Christian
Civilization." Reluctantly at first, Bard yielded
to the urging of the reform Republican leader, Dr. Chester Rowell
of Fresno, and entered the Senate race. It took a year of wrangling
and a special session of the legislature for the anti-railroad
Republicans to get Bard elected. At one point in the contest Governor
Henry Gage, a railroad man, met secretly with William F. Herrin
of the SP Political Bureau in rooms rented under a fake name in
the Palace Hotel in San Francisco to plot strategy. Bard's public
reception in Sacramento following his election contrasted dramatically
with what would undoubtedly have been a more robust affair for
Colonel Burns. Only lemonade was served, a small string orchestra
played, and no ladies of the demimonde were in evidence. Whether
out of boredom or pique, pro-SP Governor Gage boycotted the affair.
Two years later the SP was further assaulted.
Neither candidate to succeed Gage as governorRepublican
George Pardee, mayor of Oakland, and Democrat Franklin Lane,
city attorney of San Franciscowas out of the SP political
stable. Had Lane won the election, an avowed SP enemy would have
sat in the governor's chair, but the prospect of the independent-minded
Lane as governor also frightened an ambitious Democrat by the
name of William Randolph Hearst, by then based in New York, who
did not want Lane, a brilliant journalist and lawyer, to threaten
Hearst control of the Democratic party in California. At Hearst's
behest the San Francisco Examiner failed to get behind
Lane's candidacy. Defeated, Lane went on to Washington in 1906,
appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt to the newly formed
Interstate Commerce Commission. Lane probed the SP with a special
vengeance, finding, among other things, that the SP favored 103
large California corporations and ranches and price-gouged the
others.